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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
be ultra vires. Under the Missouri doctrine, this is not prohibited provided
the corporation thereby carries out objects it could carry out if acting di-
rectly. The court cites State v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. (1911), 237 Mo.
338, 141 S. W. 643; also 241 Mo. 1, 144 S. W. 863. In this case the
State of Missouri failed in an action to oust the defendant of its charter
for owning stock in two coal mining companies and an elevator company,
the court holding a company could do through the ownership of stock what-
ever it could do directly; and that here these activities were necessary to
the railroad's business and could have been done directly. Formerly Illinois
took a view directly contrary. See People v. Pullman Car Co. (1898), 175
Ill. 125. But by Statute in 1925 this rule was changed. Smith-Hurd's
Rev. St. 1925, C. 32, Sec. 2. See also 156 N. E. at 264. The Missouri
doctrine with its application to the present facts, is expressed in the Long-
Bell case in these words: "Each and every kind of business carried on by
these various subsidiaries (except perhaps the work of dredging) was only
such business as respondent could, under its charter powers, have carried
on directly." D. A. M., '29.
CORPORATIONS, LIABILITr OF PROMOTER ON PREORGANIZATION CONTRACT.-
The plaintiff made an employment contract with two individuals, promoters
and prospective directors of a proposed corporation, for the benefit of and
in the name of the corporation to be formed. Held, the individuals are not
personally liable on that contract. Schwedtman v. Burns (Tex. 1928), 11
S. W. (2d) 348.
The fact that the promoter has contracted for the benefit of the corpora-
tion does not of itself absolve him from personal liability on that contract.
Queen City Furniture Co. v. Crawford (1894), 127 Mo. 356, 30 S. W. 163;
Lewis v. Fisher (1912), 167 Mo. A. 674, 151 S. W. 172. In the Queen City
Furniture Co. case the court held the promoters liable by reasoning on an
analogy from agency: the agent is personally bound where the principal
is not known or where there is no responsible principal. 2 Kent, COMMEN-
TAmRS 630; Blakely v. Benneclke (1875), 59 Mo. 193. Though the analogy
is fallacious, there being no principal in existence when the corporation is
not yet formed, the effect is the same; for an agent is liable where he pur-
ports to act for a non-existent principal. 2 C. J. 808. If the corporation
is in existence when the contract is made, the knowledge or ignorance of
that fact by the third party may determine the liability of the promoter.
Rust-Owen Lumber Co. v. Wellman (1897), 10 S' D. 122, 72 N. W. 89. But
some cases held the promoter liable even where the third party knew of the
existence of the corporation, provided the contract was actually made with
the promoters. Bonsall v. Platt (1907), 153 F. 126, 82 C. C. A. 260.
However, the principal case is in line with the general weight of author-
ity today. When the parties rely on the credit of the proposed corporation
the courts will usually give effect to their intentions, so that the promoters
will escape liability. Queen City Furniture Co. v. Crawford, supra; Car-
mody v. Powers (1886), 60 Mich. 26; 1 Fletcher, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS,
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329. If the contract is one which the corporation could not adopt the
promoters are personally liable. Marshalltown First National Bank v.
Church Federation of America (1906), 129 Iowa 268, 105 N. W. 578. But see
Durgin v. Smith (1903), 133 Mich. 331, 94 N. W. 1044, where it was held
that even where the contract was not binding on the proposed corporation,
the promoters are not liable. Where, in such cases, there is an absence of
stipulation as to liability in the contract between promoters and third
parties the promoters are usually held liable. Kelner v. Baxter (1866),
L. R. 2 C. P. 174; Martin v. Fewell (1883), 79 Mo. 401; Munson v. Syracuse
G. and C. R. Co. (1886), 103 N. Y. 58, 8 N. E. 355. M. E. C., '29.
HABEAs CoRPuS-ExIsTENcE OF REMEDY BY APPEAL OR WRIT OF ERROR-
JURIsDICTION.-Defendant was charged with having intoxicating liquor in
his possession. He pleaded guilty, was sentenced to six months in jail,
Bell. None of these courts has declared a sterilization statute to be in
was insufficient in that it did not specify the date upon which the alleged
crime was committed. His appeal bond seemed to have been disallowed.
After the time allowed for appeal had expired, defendant sued out this writ
of habeas corpus. The court issued the writ and on the hearing discharged
the defendant from custody. Ex parte Syndor (Mo., 1928), 10 S. W. (2d)
63.
From the face of this decision, it seems that the court deviated from the
ironclad rule that a writ of habeas corpus will be issued only to test the
jurisdiction of the court which committed the prisoner. This rule is fol-
lowed in nearly every state of the union. Henry v. Henkel (1914), 235
U. S. 219; People v. Zimmer (1911), 252 Ill. 9, 96 N. E. 529; Ex parte
Mason (1884), 16 Mo. A. 41; State v. Dobson (1896), 135 Mo. 1, 36 S. W.
238; People v. Hanley (1921), 191 N. Y. S. 501; Ex parte O'Connor (1915),
29 Cal. A. 225, 155 P. 115. Nor will a writ of habeas corpus issue in lieu
of an appeal or writ of error. In re Lincoln (1906), 202 U. S. 178; Peo-
ple v. Murphy (1904), 212 Ill. 584, 72 N. E. 902; In re Lewis (1900), 124
Mich. 199, 82 N. W. 816. The court justifies its opinion, however, by ex-
pressly holding that a faulty information is a nullity, and that the court
acquires no jurisdiction thereunder; and that since the court had no juris-
diction, and an appeal could no longer be brought, the writ of habeas corpus
was rightfully issued and the defendant rightfully discharged.
But is the mere omission of the date of the crime an essential defect?
It seems not. State v. Myrberg (1909), 56 Wash. 384, 105 P. 622; State
v. Hurley (1912), 242 Mo. 452, 146 S. W. 1154; Walker v. State (1912), 12
Ga. A. 91, 76 S. E. 762; Colwell v. State (1916), 17 Ga. A. 750, 88 S. E.
410; Ex parte Mitchum (1922), 91 Tex. Cr. R. 62, 237 S. W. 936. The
above cases and many others agree that where time is not of the essence
of crime charged, it is immaterial.
Since the omission of time in the indictment is a mere formal requisite,
it may be waived, either by express or implied waiver. In the principal
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